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From Growth to Green Investment Diagnostics 
 
Stephen Spratt, Ana Pueyo, Simon Bawakyillenuo and Helen Hoka Osiolo 
 
 
Summary 
 
The need to shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy systems is now broadly accepted, and 
our understanding of how different policy mechanisms can support this process is growing. 
To date, much of this research has focused on developed countries, but the need for this 
shift is increasingly being recognised as important in countries at all levels of development. 
The circumstances of these countries are different, however, suggesting that approaches to 
policy identification and evaluation may also need to be adapted. These differences are 
found in three areas: first, many developing country governments face severe budget 
constraints and competing calls on public resources to address poverty. The finances 
available to support policy mechanisms are therefore more limited than in many developed 
countries. Second, given the immaturity of financial systems, the most important obstacles to 
investment in renewable energy may be unrelated to the specifics of these investments, but 
reflect more general problems. Third, while issues of political economy are important for 
power sectors everywhere, they can be particularly pronounced in developing country 
settings. Before we can assess the potential effectiveness of different policy mechanisms to 
support renewable energy investment in developing countries, therefore, we need first to 
understand what the most important constraints to these investment are. Given the very 
large number of potential constraints, an approach is needed to narrow this set 
systematically, and identify those constraints which are most important, or ‘binding’. The 
research presented in this paper adapts and extends the ‘growth diagnostics’ approach 
developed by Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2004) for this purpose, and applies this to 
renewable energy investment in two developing countries: Ghana and Kenya. The resulting 
‘green investment diagnostics’ thus complements existing work on policy evaluation in 
developed countries, offering a diagnostic tool specifically designed for developing country 
settings that could be applied alongside these mechanisms. 
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Introduction 
 
The need to shift national energy systems away from fossil fuels towards renewable sources 
is now broadly accepted. As renewables have generally been more expensive than fossil fuel 
alternatives, however, this has usually required some kind of public policy support to make 
projects competitive. Given that a number of different policy tools could potentially achieve 
this goal, it is important to be able to robustly assess their relative effectiveness.  
 
A range of methodologies has been developed to inform such decisions. Until relatively 
recently, cost-benefit analyses (CBA) have been the principal approach. As environmental 
goods are often non-traded, however, this required environmental valuation techniques to be 
developed and refined, allowing environmental impacts to be incorporated in CBA 
assessments more generally (Pearce 1998).  
 
As well as concerns over the monetisation of nature in some quarters, CBAs have been 
criticised on methodological grounds. Critics point out that CBA is underpinned by 
neoclassical assumptions such as ‘representative agent’, which prevents the views of 
heterogeneous stakeholders being taken into account, and ‘immutable preferences’, which 
precludes the possibility that environmental preferences will change as awareness grows 
(Greening and Bernow 2004). Also, while the economic efficiency CBA measure is an 
important consideration, it is not the only one. If the goal of policy is relatively tightly defined, 
for example, then ‘cost effectiveness’ may be a more appropriate evaluation criterion.1  
 
Appropriate evaluation criteria are crucial. While there is no consensus on which are most 
important for assessing environmental policies, a number of criteria, in addition to those 
given above, are found in the literature (Gupta et al. 2007; Harrington, Morgenstern and 
Sterner 2004; Mundaca and Neij 2009):  
 
 environmental effectiveness is the extent to which environmental goals are achieved;  
 low transaction costs, which may be hidden and are often higher than assumed in 
standard CBA or cost effectiveness estimates;2  
 equitable distribution of the costs and benefits resulting from the policy; 
 political and institutional feasibility, or whether there is sufficient support and legitimacy 
for the policy, and sufficient institutional capacity to design and implement the policy. 
 
As these criteria tend not to be included in CBAs,3 tools able to capture a range of criteria 
have been developed, most notably multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) models. MCDM 
approaches seek to identify Pareto optimal policies, where no other feasible policy exists that 
is at least as good on all other criterion, and better on at least one (Greening and Bernow  
op cit.).  
 
                                               
1  Economic efficiency is distinct from cost effectiveness. In the latter, the goal of policy is firmly specified, with different 
approaches assessed on how cost effectively they can achieve these goals. In the former, the goal of policy is a part of 
the appraisal. For example, when considering how much to prioritise different forms of transport intervention – roads, 
rail, cycle routes – a cost-benefit analysis would be used. If considering how to maximise the amount of roads built for a 
given budget, a cost-effectiveness approach would be used.  
2  An interesting strand of literature has developed to assess the role of transaction costs in evaluating environmental 
policies. As pointed out above, many energy efficiency measures are assumed to have negative economic costs, yet 
they are not adopted to the extent this would imply. One explanation is that transaction costs are significantly higher 
than assumed. See Mundaca, Mansoz, Neij and Timilsina (2013) for a review.  
3  There is no reason in principle why CBAs could not take account of distributional or equity considerations by altering the 
weight given to benefits that accrue to different groups. Poverty considerations might see benefits to the poor over-
weighted, for example, which would also be compatible with the diminishing marginal utility of income from a welfare 
perspective. Greening and Bernow (2004) suggest Rawls’ ‘max-min’ criterion would have a similar effect.  
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Through the application of these techniques, we now have a better understanding of which 
are likely to be most effective in different circumstances. A shortcoming is that they have 
largely been applied to high-income countries. Our concern, however, is with understanding 
how low and middle income countries can avoid becoming locked into fossil-fuel energy 
systems. More specifically, we seek to identify the most important obstacles to the expansion 
of renewable capacity, and to specify the policy instruments most likely to address these 
obstacles. This requires a different approach to those described above for three reasons.  
 
First, developing country governments face more severe budget constraints than their high-
income country counterparts, and also have other urgent policy priorities, particularly poverty 
alleviation. As a result, providing substantial and sustained financial support for renewable 
energy is not as feasible. To take account of this, we focus on renewable energy projects 
that are broadly economically and financially competitive with fossil-fuels.4 The abundance of 
renewable energy resources in many developing countries, combined with the falling costs 
and increasing efficiency of renewable technologies, make competitive renewable energy 
technologies a growing set.  
 
Second, obstacles to renewable energy investment in developing countries may have little to 
do with environmental policies. Financial markets tend to be immature and perceived risks 
higher. As a result, there is generally less finance, particularly long-term finance, available. 
Some of the most important constraints may therefore be a problem for longer-term 
investments more generally. Alternatively, some countries may be able to generate sufficient 
funds, but renewable projects may be relatively unattractive for a variety of reasons, which 
may or may not be policy-dependent. Distinguishing between these different types of 
constraints is important.  
 
Third, although the policy evaluation tools described above increasingly take account of 
political feasibility, questions of political economy are often more important in developing 
countries, particularly in energy sectors. Mapping the political waters (in terms of the actors, 
interests and incentives) in the chosen policy area is thus particularly important for effective 
policy design. 
 
These three factors suggest that, before policy options can be evaluated, prior steps are 
needed in low- and middle-income country settings. First, the area where policy intervention 
is most needed must be identified. Second, the set of policy options that are likely to be 
feasible from a political economy perspective needs to be defined. From the perspective of 
policy-makers in low- and middle-income countries these issues translate into the following 
questions: 
 
(i) To what extent should they seek to develop renewable energy sources?  
(ii) If renewables are to be part of the energy mix, which technologies should be prioritised?  
(iii) Once a particular technology has been prioritised, what types of policy measure are 
likely to facilitate investment? 
(iv) Which of these measures are most likely to successfully navigate the choppy waters of 
real-world politics?  
 
The methodology set out in this paper aims to provide guidance on each of these questions. 
On the first two questions we focus on technologies that are economically and financially 
viable, as well as being technically feasible in particular locations. For the third, considerable 
research has examined barriers to investment in developed countries, but this is often less 
useful than it could be for low-income economies.5 A wide range of obstacles are often cited, 
                                               
4  Economic viability takes into account ‘returns’ for society as a whole, whilst financial viability looks at the private returns 
for firms or individuals. 
5  See Pueyo, Spratt, Schmitz, Willenbockel, Dent, Wade and Crosland (2015) for a review of this literature.  
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with suites of reforms recommended to address them. This does not identify which obstacles 
are most important, and so which policy areas could maximise ‘bang for bucks’. For countries 
with severe budget constraints and finite policy formulation capacity, this is a major problem.  
 
This resembles the situation with historical research on growth in developing countries, 
where far-reaching, non-prioritised and politically unrealistic reform programmes were often 
proposed. This led Hausman et al. (2004) to develop the growth diagnostics approach to 
identify the ‘binding constraints’ to growth. Growth diagnostics assumes that more severe 
problems should produce observable ‘symptoms’. Based on this logic, a framework was 
developed to home in systematically on the binding constraints on growth through the 
accumulation and triangulation of evidence. Policy interventions could then be focused in 
these areas. 
 
Due to these similarities in problem and context, we have developed the green investment 
diagnostics framework for the ex-ante selection of areas of policy intervention most likely to 
remove obstacles to investment in renewable technologies. The rest of the paper is 
structured as follows. Part 1 describes the growth diagnostics approach developed by 
Hausmann et al. (2004) and its relationship with green investment diagnostics. Part 2 
describes the methodology and data used. Part 3 gives background on Kenya and Ghana. 
Part 4 gives selected, preliminary findings from the ongoing piloting of the framework in these 
countries, and concludes.  
 
 
1 From growth to green investment 
diagnostics 
 
Hausman et al. (2004) developed the growth diagnostics framework to answer the following 
question: ‘For this particular country, at this particular time, what is preventing the country 
from achieving higher sustained and shared growth?’ (Haussmann, Klinger and Wagner 
2008: 4). Their methodology is based on the idea that ‘there may be many reasons why an 
economy does not grow, but each reason generates a distinctive set of symptoms’ (ibid.: 4). 
The identification of these symptoms through a logical decision tree framework enables a 
weight of evidence to be built and the identification of the most binding constraint to growth.  
 
The process starts by asking what is restraining growth in the most fundamental level, ruling 
out potential constraints in some cases, and following the line of reasoning in others as 
increasingly specific questions are asked at each level. Is low investment due to low potential 
returns or a lack of finance? If it is low returns, is this because of a lack of supporting 
infrastructure, for example. At each level, questions are addressed by searching for evidence 
of four diagnostic signals that we would expect to see if a potential constraint was ‘binding’:  
 
(i) The price (or shadow price) of the constraint should be high. 
(ii) Historical movements in the constraint should produce significant changes in the desired 
outcome.  
(iii) Agents in the economy should be attempting to overcome or bypass the constraint. 
(iv) Agents less intensive in the constraint are more likely to survive and thrive, and vice 
versa. 
 
The process is thus one of elimination, with potentially binding constraints ruled out when no 
symptoms are found, allowing an increasing focus on those most likely to be problematic and 
a continuing accumulation of evidence for and against these options.  
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Our framework adapts and extends this approach to investment in the renewable energy 
sector, asking: ‘for this country, at this particular time, what is preventing higher levels of 
investment in a specific technology for which there is an economic rationale?’ We draw a 
number of features from the growth diagnostic approach: we assume some constraints are 
more important than others and that it possible to identify these systematically; a logical 
decision-tree framework is used to identify these constraints and test for observable 
‘symptoms’; Finally, we employ an iterative approach to build and triangulate a cumulative 
weight of evidence.  
 
Some important differences should be noted. First, our aim is not to increase growth rates, 
but to increase the rate of investment in particular renewable energy technologies. Second, 
while growth diagnostics emphasises the need to identify a single, binding constraint, our 
approach is likely to identify more than one constraint, though the number would still be low. 
Third, where growth diagnostics looks for symptoms of binding constraints using the four 
‘diagnostic signals’ listed above, we introduce an important prior step. This reduces the large 
initial set of potential constraints through a quantitative assessment between comparable 
countries. Having identified a small set of issues that are most likely to be problematic, we 
then apply an adapted version of the diagnostic assessment described above.  
 
A fourth difference is that identifying the binding constraint(s) is not the end of the story. Our 
approach also involves political economy analysis to map and navigate the policy process.  
 
Reform in the power sector is often a highly politicised process (Besant-Jones 2006). 
Increases in electricity prices and vested interests can be powerful sources of political 
opposition. Lack of political commitment can also frustrate implementation of agreed policies. 
Identifying the actors who seek to block or adopt different policies is thus as important as 
identifying the binding constraint. Our political economy approach builds from the insights of 
Brian Levy’s ‘working with the grain’ approach. Levy argues that optimal solutions may be 
unachievable but workable ways forward may nonetheless be found by identifying the 
sources of support for reform and using them as entry points that can unleash an ongoing, 
virtuous circle of cumulative change (Levy 2014). Having identified the most important area 
for policy interventions, this can help inform which policies are most likely to be feasible, and 
therefore effective in addressing the identified issue.  
 
 
2 Green investment diagnostics: methodology 
 
The green investment diagnostics (GID) approach has the following steps: 
 
(i) Identify target technologies that are economically and financial viable. 
(ii) Undertake a comparative assessment of potential constraints to investment in these 
technologies using economic and social indicators organised in a hierarchical decision-
tree framework. 
(iii) Undertake a deeper search for diagnostic evidence in areas identified as potentially 
problematic to identify policy areas which are the most ‘binding’. 
(iv) Conduct political economy analysis to identify the most viable policy options in these 
areas given political economy realities in the country concerned.   
 
2.1 Identify target technologies (i.e. asking the right question) 
 
Our dependent variable is the sub-optimal adoption of particular renewable generation 
technologies for which there is an economic rationale. The diagnosis must therefore start 
with the history of relevant investments in the country and the costs of different renewable 
energy technologies. Is investment insufficient in all generation technologies, for example, or 
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only in renewables? Are there periods of intense activity or stagnation? Are these linked to 
growth or other factors? Which renewables are most cost-competitive with fossil fuel 
alternatives?  
 
Answering these questions will suggest technologies where investment is less than would be 
expected given the country context and relative economic and financial attractiveness. 
Target technologies to be analysed should meet the following conditions: 
 
 The relevant renewable energy resources are abundant but underutilised. 
 They are low economic cost technologies in the country. 
 They do not impose excessive balancing costs on the electricity system. 
 They are potentially financially competitive with fossil fuel alternatives (or can be made 
so at reasonable cost and duration to the government). 
 
The first condition is assessed by comparing the renewable energy resource technical 
potential with forecasted demand and the installed and planned capacity using the resource. 
This shows which technologies are underinvested compared to their technical potential. 
 
The second condition concerns the economic attractiveness of potential technologies 
compared to alternatives. The economic cost of different generation alternatives can be 
assessed with the levelised cost of energy (LCOE), which measures the total cost of 
production over a project’s lifetime. This includes capital investments and discounted future 
operation and maintenance (O&M) costs. The total quantity of discounted electricity 
produced is divided by discounted costs to give a unit cost, or LCOE. 
 
To calculate LCOE on an economic rather than financial basis we need to include all net 
costs borne by society. We thus include externalities, exclude taxes and use social discount 
rates rather than the cost of finance. Externalities mostly refer to the damage cost of SO2, 
NOx, CO2 and particulates when the generator does not pay for the damage through taxes or 
other mechanisms. Subsidies refer to both capital and operations. All capital costs relevant to 
the project, even if not paid by the investor, such as transmission lines required for a project, 
are included. Social discount rates reflect the cost of finance in the absence of specific 
market or technology risks. 
 
An economic assessment of renewable energy technologies must also take account of the 
balancing costs they impose on the system. This is the third condition. Time variable energy 
resources like wind and solar PV contribute less to capacity adequacy6 than flexible sources, 
many of which are fossil fuel based. Thus, while variable, low-carbon technologies have low 
operating cost, they may also supply little capacity compared to fossil fuels. Renewables 
technologies may therefore increase system costs due to the greater operating reserves that 
must be carried to manage uncertainty. Whether these effects should be included in LCOE 
calculations remains controversial, not least as whole-system costs are not confined to one 
technology alone. For simplicity, we propose to keep the assessment of balancing costs 
separate from LCOE calculations.7  
 
Our final condition concerns the financial viability of renewable energy projects, and the 
means by which this is achieved. Financial viability is assessed through the risk-adjusted 
financial rate of return (FRR), which must be competitive with other investment options to be 
                                               
6  Capacity that can meet peak residual demand. 
7  The estimation of balancing costs needs to be specialised to local conditions. An approach to assess the balancing 
costs of increased variable capacity consists of two steps: First, assessing the additional operating reserve volumes 
required to balance a given intermittent capacity and the related cost per MWh generated. Second, identifying and 
estimating quantitatively any binding engineering limits on the total variable generation capacity which can be integrated 
in the present system and in future scenarios for installed controllable capacity. This requires discussions with local 
engineers who have knowledge of operating reserve requirements in the relevant national context. 
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viable. We assess financial viability by comparing the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of 
different renewable energy technologies and with a benchmark rate of return.8 As only costs 
and revenues for the investor are considered, we include taxes and subsidies, use the actual 
cost of debt, but exclude externality costs not borne by the investor. The IRR of fossil fuel 
based generation projects is used as a benchmark for comparison. Other benchmarks used 
are taken from investments with similar risk-return characteristics. Examples include energy 
and other infrastructure projects in countries with similar risk profiles, or returns from other 
asset classes with similar levels of risk that could occupy a similar position in a diversified 
investment portfolio. 
 
Technologies that are competitive with fossil fuels from an economic perspective may still be 
financially unattractive for two reasons. First, economic measures include externalities but 
financial measures do not. Second, economic viability is measured using the social discount 
rate, whereas financial viability uses the actual cost of finance. Economically viable projects 
may thus be rendered financially unviable where the costs of financing are high. As 
renewable energy projects generally require larger upfront investment, the cost of finance is 
a larger proportion of total project costs than comparable fossil-fuel projects. This is 
particularly problematic in developing countries, which are viewed as higher risk by investors, 
raising the cost of finance.  
 
The usual solution to both issues – i.e. the way that financial viability is achieved – is to 
subsidise renewable energy project revenues through price premiums delivered via 
mechanisms like feed-in-tariffs, or to subsidise costs. As we are concerned with avoiding 
excessive public costs to developing country governments, the key question is how large 
these subsidies need to be, how long they are required for, and who will meet them? Where 
the subsidy is small and likely to diminish further over time, the benefits of renewable energy 
may justify this. Where the cost is large, however, it is unreasonable to expect the 
government of a developing country to bear this cost, which amounts to a drag on its 
development prospects. If public financial support is provided by external actors, perhaps 
through donor support, however, this constraint no longer applies. 
 
Having identified attractive renewable technologies where investment has been historically 
low in the country but potential is high, we ask what are the most important factors 
constraining investment in these particular technologies in this country? The remaining steps 
of the green investment diagnostics approach are designed to answer this question and 
develop solutions.  
 
2.2 International comparison of potential constraints: diagnostics decision tree 
 
A very large number of issues could potentially affect whether or not particular investment 
are made. Narrowing this down to a manageable size requires a method of assessment 
broad enough to capture the full set of options, but detailed enough to provide guidance on 
where more detailed analysis should be applied.  
 
There are two parts to this process. First, following Hausmann et al. (2004) a decision-tree is 
developed to capture potential constraints. The first ‘node’ on the tree starts with the 
question: why is investment in technology X so low? There are two possible answers. Either 
the type of finance needed is not available, or there is a sufficient supply of suitable finance, 
but the investment is not attractive compared to alternatives. These two options (which are 
not mutually exclusive) divide to form the next level of the decision-tree. Another way of 
looking at it is that two separate decision-trees are formed at this point, one exploring 
potential constraint in the financial system (i.e. that could be important for any type of 
                                               
8  The IRR is defined as the rate of return that brings a series of positive and negative cash flows to a net present value of 
zero, hence measuring the underlying return the equity investor expects to achieve by investing in the project. 
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investment), the other exploring constraints that are specific to the particular investment in 
question.  
 
If there are problems in the investment-specific decision-tree, is it because risks are too high, 
or returns too low. If it is a question of risk, which risks? If returns are too low, is this because 
revenues are insufficient or costs are too high? Similarly, if there are problems in the finance-
supply decision-tree, is this because sufficient capital does not exist, or because financial 
institutions are not intermediating these funds efficiently? If the problem is intermediation, is 
this due to a lack of competition and, if so, what factors are restricting competition? And so 
on.  
 
As one moves down each decision-tree, potential constraints become more specific and 
explanatory – i.e. we may know that a lack of competition in the banking sector is low, but 
this becomes policy relevant if we know why this is the case. At each decision-point, possible 
explanations are assessed through international comparison. For each branch – or ‘node’ – 
of the decision-trees (e.g. is competition in the banking sector too low?) proxy variables are 
identified, and the ‘performance’ in our target country is compared with that in other 
countries.  
 
Here we have organised comparator countries by income group, and calculated the ‘best’ 
and ‘worst’ for each group, as well as averages (median or mean as appropriate). All low, 
middle and high income countries are used in this assessment. In total, each decision tree 
consist of 5 or more levels, 70 or more decision-points, and roughly double this number of 
proxy variables. All variables are normalised between 0 and 100, with the country receiving a 
score in this range. 
 
This ‘first order symptom diagnosis’ provides an initial assessment of potential problem 
areas. From more than 140 potential constraints, analysis of the level and pattern of country 
performance in each area allows us to narrow the search significantly. In simple terms, if a 
middle-income country is the best performing of all middle-income countries in a particular 
area, it is unlikely that this is a major constraint to investment. The hierarchical approach of 
increasing specificity enables us to say more than this, however. The identification of areas 
of potential concern at one level is augmented by analysis of possible causes in subsequent 
levels. As potential problem areas are ruled out, we are left with a small number of areas 
which the evidence suggests may be the most important constraint, and a growing 
understanding of why. 
 
2.3 Identification of the binding constraints: deep diagnostic evidence 
 
As well as highlighting areas of potential concern, the comparative approach described 
above indicates which may be the most severe – i.e. a score of 1 is more potentially troubling 
that one of 49. Whilst these differences in scale provide suggestive evidence of the severity 
of constraints, however, they are not conclusive. As pointed out by Hausmann et al. (2004) 
the scale of a problem may not always equate to how ‘binding’ it is. In some cases, a country 
may score extremely badly in a particular area, for example, but this may have little impact 
on investment incentives. To address this issue, the second order symptom assessment 
looks for supporting or refuting evidence in the areas identified as potentially important.  
 
Following Hausmann et al. (2004), we look for ‘diagnostic signals’ in four areas. 
 
2.3.1 The (shadow) price of the constraint should be high  
 
Where the issue is a shortage of supply – e.g. finance, infrastructure, skills, confidence, 
stability – we would expect the price to be high. If the constraint is an insufficient supply of 
general finance, for example, we would expect to see very high real interest rates. If the 
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problem was restricted to long-term finance, then interest rates for this type of finance should 
be high. If a lack of supporting infrastructure was binding, we would expect the infrastructure 
that did exist to generate high returns. This is not restricted to constraints with market prices. 
The problem may be a lack of skilled workers, a symptom of which would be high wages in 
relevant sectors.  
 
If the issue is excessive risk, we would expect to see this reflected in mitigation instruments 
like insurance premiums or exchange rate hedging tools. If the first-order assessment 
suggests that returns are being depressed by high costs, the second stage would dig deeper, 
identifying specific prices and shadow prices, to focus in on which elements are the most 
important. 
 
2.3.2 Movements in the constraint should produce significant change in the desired 
outcome  
 
If the constraint is binding, we would expect to see significant impacts when it is relaxed - i.e. 
more finance generally, or increased allocation of capital to these kinds of investment. Where 
the high cost of finance is the issue, for example, historical periods of low real interest rates 
should be associated with increased investment. If the constraint is a lack of international 
finance, then historical periods of relatively high capital inflows should be associated with an 
increased availability of long-term investment funds. Such a finding would lead to further 
examinations of the constraints to increasing the supply of international finance, and so on.  
 
Where a lack of competition between banks is reducing the supply of long-term, affordable 
finance, periods of greater competition should result in an increase in this supply. In contrast, 
if long-term finance exists but is being skewed towards long-dated government bonds 
because of high interest rates, then low government rates should see long-term, private 
investment rise.  
 
2.3.3 Agents in the economy should be attempting to overcome or bypass the 
constraint  
 
Where problems are serious, we would expect to observe firms and households trying to 
overcome them. A lack of infrastructure should lead to greater use of alternatives, for 
example. Problems with electricity supply would see businesses using their own generators. 
A lack of capital from the financial system would cause firms to use more of their internal 
resources. 
 
There are too many potential constraints to anticipate the behaviours for every case. An 
intermediate step is to think in terms of general categories of constraint, as in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1 Examples of symptoms caused by avoidance of types of constraint 
 
Supply of appropriate finance Relative attractiveness of investment 
Category of constraint Potential behaviour Category of constraint Potential behaviour 
Market competition too low Monopolistic practices; 
informal alternatives 
Revenues too low Search for alternatives; poor 
maintenance 
Inputs unavailable and/or 
expensive 
Low usage; use of 
alternatives 
Costs too high Low usage; use of alternatives 
Supporting physical 
infrastructure lacking or 
poor 
Development of 
alternatives 
Risks too great High use of formal and informal 
mitigation tools 
Supporting policy framework 
lacking or poor 
Development of informal 
alternatives 
Portfolio benefits weak or 
lacking 
Strong, synchronised cyclical 
patterns of behaviour 
Social and economic 
context too volatile 
Risk averse behaviour Social and economic context 
too volatile 
Risk averse behaviour 
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Although these categories are too general to provide guidance from a policy perspective, 
they illustrate the logic used in the analysis.  
 
2.3.4 Agents less intensive in the constraint more likely to survive and thrive, and vice 
versa 
 
While the presence of a constraint should encourage agents to avoid it, advantages will also 
be conferred on businesses that are less reliant upon it, and vice versa. Hausmann et al. 
(2008) describe this with an evocative metaphor: 
 
What is the binding constraint to animals thriving in the Sahara desert? This is not 
unlike the question of what limits economic growth in a country. However, in the 
Sahara, it is instructive to note that of those few animals that do thrive in that 
environment, a very large proportion are camels and a very small proportion are 
hippopotamus. The fact that the animals most intensive in the use of water, 
hippopotamus, are scarce while the animals least intensive in the use of water, camels, 
are thriving suggests that the supply of water may be a binding constraint to the spread 
of animals in the Sahara. 
(Hausmann et al. 2008) 
 
Different sectors use different inputs more or less intensively. Tobacco firms, for example, 
have relatively high cash-flows and so are less dependent on external finance than sectors 
like plastics or textiles. With respect to finance, tobacco firms are ‘camels’ and plastics firms 
are ‘hippos’. If access to finance is the binding constraint, therefore, we would expect to see 
cash-rich sectors performing relatively well (ibid.). What this might mean in its broadest 
sense for our categories of constraints is sketched in Table 2.2.  
 
 
Table 2.2 Examples of those likely to thrive given particular constraints 
 
Supply of appropriate finance Relative attractiveness of investment 
Category of constraint Potential beneficiaries Category of constraint Potential beneficiaries 
Market competition too 
low 
Incumbents Revenues too low Providers of alternative sources 
of revenue 
Inputs unavailable 
and/or expensive 
Those using none/few of the 
inputs 
Costs too high Those using none/few of the 
inputs, or with abnormally high 
revenues 
Supporting physical 
infrastructure lacking or 
poor 
Those not reliant on this 
infrastructure 
Risks too great Those not exposed to risk, or 
able to naturally hedge 
Supporting policy 
framework lacking or 
poor 
Those not reliant on policy 
support, or able to create 
effective alternatives 
Portfolio benefits weak or 
lacking 
Those able to anticipate and 
benefit from cyclical processes  
Social and economic 
context too volatile 
Those insulated from volatility, 
or benefiting from it  
Social and economic context 
too volatile 
Those insulated from volatility or 
benefiting from it 
 
 
Taken on their own, none of these four ‘diagnostic signals’ might be sufficient to identify a 
binding constraint with certainty. As they are worked through, however, evidence supporting 
particular constraints will build cumulatively. As this evidence comes independently from 
different sources, the resulting triangulation should also build confidence. By the end of the 
process, therefore, a reasonable hypothesis should have emerged as to which policy areas 
exhibit constraints that are ‘binding’ with respect to investment in general, and to investment 
in the target technologies in particular. The final stage of the methodology applies a ‘rapid 
15 
political economy analysis’ to the identified policy areas, with the aim of identifying which 
policy options are likely to be most feasible given the country context.  
 
 
3 Country context for Kenya and Ghana 
 
Fieldwork to test and refine the approach is ongoing in Kenya and Ghana. Before presenting 
some preliminary results, the following sections provide some brief background information.  
 
3.1 Energy and renewable energy in Kenya 
 
Electricity generation in Kenya comes from both renewable and non-renewable sources.  
Renewable energy accounts for about 72 per cent of the total electricity, most of which is 
hydro and geothermal. Thermal energy from fossil-fuel sources accounts for most of the rest 
of Kenya’s energy supply. Of the sources considered, wind has the least effective capacity of 
25.5 MW, which equates to just 0.2 per cent of generating capacity. Solar power in Kenya is 
mainly from off-grid, so is not included in these estimates. 
 
The country is implementing the ‘5000+MW plan’ to increase installed capacity to 6,762MW 
by 2017. An important component of this is Kenya’s Least Cost Development Plan (LCDP), 
which attempts to ensure that the country’s energy supply expands using the most cost 
effective sources. 
 
 
Table 3.1 Energy production in Kenya, 2013 
 
 
Effective capacity(MW) Generation (%) 
Hydro  797.0  39.1 
Thermal  632.0  28.3 
Geothermal  347.8  31.9 
Cogeneration  21.5  0.5 
Wind  25.5  0.2 
Total  1823.8  100.0 
Source: GoK (2015). 
 
 
According to the LCDP, the LCOE ranking of base load projects identifies geothermal with a 
load factor of 93 per cent as the least cost source (LCOE between 6.9 Us/kWh to 9.2 
Us/kWh). Wind was also quite competitive, with an LCOE ranging between 9.1 Us/kWh to 
12.2 Us/kWh.9 
 
Despite these ambitious expansion plans, chronic delays in implementation are common. 
Also, more than half of the planned expansion of supply will come from carbon intensive 
generation capacity, mainly coal and natural gas, while renewables with a large potential, 
namely wind and solar, remain unutilised. As well as high quality solar resources, Kenya has 
some of the most potentially productive wind resources in the world, which remain largely 
untapped. Barriers to investment can be separated into general financial issues, and those 
particular to renewable energy or particular renewable sectors.  
 
                                               
9  The LCDP assumes a discount rate between 8 per cent and 12 per cent. 
16 
For general constraints, renewable energy technology projects require significant financing, 
but there is lack of funding and inadequate financing in Kenya (GEF 2009). Inadequate 
financing, for example, is the explanation for the relatively small amounts of electricity 
generated from geothermal since drilling began in 1955. According to Waissbein, Glenmarec, 
Bayraktar and Schmidt (2013) the country generally lacks long-term affordable financing.  
 
For renewables, GEF (2009) suggests the high up-front costs as the main barrier. To attract 
private investment, high rates of return are required. This is not straightforward in many 
cases, however, for various reasons. In the wind sector, for example, Independent Power 
Producers face barriers in access to grids, lengthy and uncertain processes to issue permits, 
limited local supply of expertise or a lack of long-term price guarantees, (Waissbein et al. 
2013). 
 
Regulatory and political barriers also form another major obstacle towards investments in 
renewable energy. GEF (2009) suggest this may be due to weak institutional frameworks 
while UNEP (2012) stress the uncertainties and risks associated with new technologies. 
 
For all these reasons, negotiating for a good tariff is key for successful investments. In 2008, 
the Ministry of Energy adopted a Feed-in Tariffs Policy, which is considered an important 
step towards attracting more investment. Many project developers, however, consider the 
tariff to be too low to boost returns sufficiently. For wind energy, the Feed-in Tariffs Policy 
only provides a tariff for wind projects of 50MW and lower (GoK 2011). Because of the lack 
of a guaranteed tariff for larger wind projects, each project has to negotiate its own tariffs with 
Kenya Power, creating significant transaction costs. Also, negotiating an attractive tariff with 
Kenya Power has proved difficult as the country has historically relied a lot on hydropower, 
which is a relatively cheap form of energy (4 USD cent/kWh) (GoK 2011). 
 
Inadequate or antiquated grid infrastructure also inhibits investments in renewable energy. In 
Kenya most renewable technologies are in remote areas where there is lack of transmission 
infrastructure to connect the project activity to the national grid. Technical issues, such as the 
inability of the grid to absorb increasing shares of fluctuating power from renewable energy 
sources are also a problem (GoK 2011). To add to this, the national transmission company 
may not provide easy access to the grid for renewable energy producers (ibid.). 
 
To summarise, while Kenya produces a significant quantity of renewable energy, this is 
focused on hydro and geothermal. The country’s unusually high quality wind resources 
remain untapped and its vast reserves of geothermal energy have tremendous scope for 
expansion. Various constraints to investment have been proposed. Identifying which of these 
are the most important, and putting in place reforms to address these, will be key to realising 
this potential.  
 
3.2 Energy and renewable energy in Ghana 
 
Before the late 1990s, Ghana’s electricity was almost entirely generated by hydropower. 
Since then, thermal (largely diesel) sources have steadily increased reaching 51 per cent of 
capacity in 2015. There is a minimal investment in non-conventional renewable energy,10 
which represented less than 1 per cent of installed capacity in 2013, as shown in Table 3.2 
below. 
 
                                               
10  Non-conventional renewable energies exclude the most mature hydro and biomass technologies. 
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Table 3.2 Energy production in Ghana, 2012 
 
 Effective capacity Capacity (%) 
Hydro  1382  52.57 
Thermal  1245  47.36 
Solar  2  0.08 
Total   2629  100.00 
Source: Energy Commission of Ghana (2013). 
 
Interestingly, most of the funds for the expansion of electricity supply, which has doubled 
since the late 1990s, have been donor-driven, with little contribution from the Government of 
Ghana. This has led to the development of conventional energy types at the expense of new 
renewables (Kumi and Brew-Hammond 2013).  
 
In recent years endemic intermittent supply shortages and environmental concerns have 
caused a shift in thinking, with considerable attention now focused on natural gas, and on 
solar and wind energy, where Ghana has abundant resources. As in Kenya, however, 
increasing investment faces major constraints.  
 
Given that Ghana’s energy sector has been largely supported by donor funding, it is 
reasonable to assume that private investment suited to these types of investment is in short 
supply in the country. The alternative hypothesis, that this type of finance is abundant but 
has been crowded out by donor funds, seems rather implausible.  
 
Turning to renewable energy specifically, the literature suggests that new renewable energy 
technologies face numerous challenges in Ghana, often thereby rendering them 
uncompetitive relative to conventional energy sources (Kemausor et al. 2012; Kemausor et 
al. 2014; Energy Commission of Ghana 2013; Ndzibah 2013). These include, inter alia: high 
up-front and operation and maintenance costs, and high perceived risk of various kinds, 
including regulatory.  
 
The fact that Ghana has such limited experience with non-conventional renewables is likely 
to make potential risks loom large in the minds of investors, as there are few if any examples 
to point to where financial, political or technical risks have been successfully overcome.  
 
Proponents argue that measures to boost project competitiveness, such as concessionary 
loans, grants, are required to change this situation, and could potentially make technologies 
such as waste to energy, wind and solar financially viable (Kemausuor et al. 2012). With 
respect to least cost technologies, wind and waste to energy are viewed as the most 
promising, but this potential remains almost entirely untapped.  
 
To summarise, unlike Kenya, Ghana has very limited experience with non-conventional 
sources of renewable energy. As well as general financial constraints, and barriers particular 
to these sectors, it must therefore overcome heightened perceptions of risk, as there is no 
track record upon which to build.  
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4 Green investment diagnostics in Kenya and 
Ghana: selected, preliminary findings 
 
The first stage of the green investment diagnostics (GID) analysis aims to narrow down the 
large set of potential constraints to a more manageable size. As described in Part 2, this has 
two components, represented as two decision-trees. One tests for symptoms of constraints 
within the financial system generally, while the second tests for project-specific issues.  
 
The first-order assessment thus identifies a small set of investment constraints to be 
analysed in more detail for ‘symptoms’ of binding constraints, before policy options are 
identified and assessed from a political economy perspective. This research is ongoing in 
both countries, with results expected in 2016.  
 
In this section we present some findings from the first-stage analysis of the financial systems. 
Following the decision-tree framework this is organised sequentially at different levels. As we 
move through these levels, symptoms and potential constraints become increasingly specific, 
focusing on potential explanations for problems previously identified.  
 
Following Hausmann et al. (2004), potential financial constraints are categorised as either a 
lack of underlying finance (insufficient capital) or a failure of the financial system to transform 
and allocate this finance efficiently (poor intermediation). At each level, the issues identified 
in the decision-tree are captured by proxy variables. Performance on these variables in 
Kenya and Ghana is then shown with respect to three comparator groups: the countries of 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA); all low-income countries (LICs); and all middle-income countries 
(MICs).  
 
All results are normalised between 0 and 100. A score of 0 would indicate that Kenya or 
Ghana is the worst performing of the group, while a score of 100 would make them the best.  
 
Here we join the analysis at level 3, the results from which are given in Table 4.1. Looking at 
potential constraints to capital first (i.e. the bottom half of the table) we see that the cost of 
savings does not seem to be an issue. This supports findings from previous levels that 
domestic savings are not a cause for concern. On external finance, restrictions on 
investment do not appear to explain the low level of capital inflows observed previously, and 
neither does macroeconomic and political instability. In all these cases, both countries 
perform well against comparators, including MICs.  
 
Turning to intermediation, we find more issues of concern. Further evidence is found that 
domestic markets may be a source of constraint for equity finance. Whether on volume, 
liquidity, or numbers of stocks, both countries score badly. For supporting infrastructure, fixed 
line broadband is an issue in both countries, but this is not the case with mobile internet, 
particularly in Kenya, where non-fixed line usage is very high. Conversely, access to 
electricity does not appear to be a constraint in Ghana, but the situation in Kenya is worse.  
 
The final area of concern is the predominance of short-term finance and the high return 
expectations of banks, with both countries performing badly on all associated measures. This 
offers some early explanation for the low competition in both banking sectors found at 
previous levels.  
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Table 4.1 Third level assessment of financial system constraints 
 
   SSA LIC MIC 
   Kenya Ghana Kenya Ghana Kenya Ghana 
 Low survival rate 
% bank assets 
liquidated 
100 . 100 . 100 . 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 I
n
te
rm
e
d
ia
ti
o
n
  
     
Only short-term 
finance 
Liquid assets to deposits 
and short term funding 
10.33 25.68   2.71 23.13 12.80 19.09 
Bank returns 
expectations 
excessive 
Return on assets      
(after tax) 
23.10 39.77 18.22 20.43 16.36 20.99 
Return on equity (after 
tax) 
43.12 48.36 27.68 28.45 23.58 25.91 
Regulation not 
tailored to different 
institutions  
Composite regulatory 
flexibility  
33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 25.00 25.00 
Lack of supporting 
infrastructure 
Fixed broadband 
subscribers 
  0.99   2.05 20.64 42.63   0.48   0.99 
Internet users 77.38 24.40 121.5 38.32 54.67 16.34 
Lack of instruments 
Stock market volume    3.08   0.26 18.92   1.60   2.49   0.26 
Stock market turnover  11.09   5.96   7.51   4.04   4.06   2.24 
Number of listed 
companies  
10.15 10.77 17.90 18.99   0.17   0.21 
  
 
Expensive savings 
Saved in last year  98.61 66.76 100.0 68.94 54.27 37.53 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 C
a
p
it
a
l 
  
 
Bank non-interest 
income to income 
75.21 68.51 75.94 69.17 67.26 62.50 
Capital controls 
Investment Freedom 
composite 
58.82 82.35 71.43 100 58.82 82.35 
Macro and political 
instability 
Inflation rate 86.80 74.50 76.41 50.02 88.93 79.14 
Public economic 
management  
100 52.63 100 50.00 94.12 41.18 
Public accountability and 
corruption  
66.67 80.95 95.00 110 63.33 73.33 
 
Taxes too high 
Taxes on income, 
profits, capital gains  
19.97 58.14   0.00 43.61 22.57 55.39 
 
 
Table 4.2 summarises findings from all levels for each country, with potentially more acute 
problems highlighted in bold.  
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Table 4.2 Summary of potential financial issues 
 
 Kenya Ghana 
 Capital  Intermediation Capital  Intermediation 
1 Low investment 
High short-term 
debt 
 
Low private sector credit 
 
Low investment 
 
Low private sector credit 
2 Low external 
savings 
Limited FDI 
Few bank branches 
Limited domestic equity 
Low bank competition 
Low external savings 
Limited FDI 
Low ODA to power 
sector 
Few bank branches 
Limited domestic equity 
Low bank competition  
3 Low incomes 
High taxes 
Short-term bias 
High return expectations 
Poor ICT infrastructure 
Low electricity access 
Illiquid stock market 
Low incomes Short-term bias 
High return expectations 
Poor ICT infrastructure 
Illiquid stock market 
4 Bank insolvency 
risk 
Regulatory entry barriers 
Regs. not promote comp. 
High short-term returns 
Bank insolvency risk Regulatory entry barriers 
Regs. not promote comp. 
High short-term returns 
5 - No public credit info. 
Low financial diversity 
 
- No public credit info.  
High short-term returns 
Low financial diversity 
Few skilled ICT workers 
 
 
While financial intermediation appears a much greater problem than the supply of capital in 
both countries, this relates to domestic rather than external finance. Domestic savings are 
relatively high, but the supply of private credit is low, suggesting that savings are not being 
intermediated through the financial systems effectively. For external finance the issue is 
different. Here both countries perform relatively badly in terms of attracting private capital 
flows of the type needed for renewable energy investment. While both countries are 
recipients of significant official development assistance (ODA), Ghana performs particularly 
badly on this measure when we look at the power sector specifically. As ODA, usually in the 
form of concessional debt, is often an important element of project finance structures in many 
countries, this may be a significant problem. The most fundamental constraints identified in 
both countries are therefore: (a) a failure to attract external capital of the form desired, and 
(b) an inability to transform and allocate domestic capital efficiently and effectively.  
 
Domestic intermediation does not appear to be constrained by an overly concentrated 
banking sector in either country. Despite relatively disbursed bank ownership, competition is 
low, and the penetration of branches limited. There is also evidence of excessive return 
expectations in both banking sectors, as well as a preference for short-term finance, 
particularly in Ghana.  
 
For causes of low competition, we find quite high barriers to entry in both countries, including 
informal barriers such as credit bureau coverage in Ghana. There is also a failure to actively 
promote competition on the part of regulatory agencies in both countries. For short-termism, 
the availability of very high short-term returns, particularly in Ghana, appears to be a 
significant explanatory factor: if banks can obtain high returns with low risk by lending short-
term to government and other more established sectors, there is a less of an incentive to 
provide longer-term finance in relatively new areas such as renewable energy.  
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For constraints to attracting external finance, concerns over political and economic instability, 
or regulatory or institutional quality do not seem to be the problem. On all measures of this 
kind, both countries perform relatively well. It seems likely that binding constraints in this area 
relate to more investment-specific risks which are addressed in the second decision-tree 
framework. The fact that Ghana attracts very little ODA to the power sector, compared with 
both other countries and with the ODA it receives more generally, is indicative of sector-
specific issues that may be constraining investment.  
 
Looking at supporting financial instruments and infrastructure, there is evidence that the 
supply of domestic equity may be operating as a constraint. While Ghana scores worse on 
some measures, detailed examination of different aspects of the domestic equity market 
finds consistently low scores for both countries. For infrastructure, access to electricity is an 
issue in Kenya but less so in Ghana. Both countries score very badly on the ICT related 
infrastructures. 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have described the green investment diagnostics methodology and given 
some early findings from its application in Kenya and Ghana. We have also provided a 
rationale for why, given the increasingly sophisticated policy evaluation tools that have been 
created, another one is needed. We hope that future work in this area will enable us to refine 
the approach further, and create a flexible tool for identifying the binding constraints to 
renewable energy investments in developing and emerging economies.  
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